IoT Lotto: Utilizing IoT Devices in Brute-Force Attacks by Alani, Mohammed M.
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
03
31
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  8
 D
ec
 20
18
IoT Lotto: Utilizing IoT Devices in Brute-Force
Attacks
Mohammed M. Alani
1 Abstract The number of IoT devices in use is increasing rapidly and so is the num-
ber of IoT applications. As in any new technology, the rapid development means
rapid increase in security threats and attack surfaces.
IoT security has proven to be challenging throughout the past few years. However,
another challenging task is to prevent IoT devices from becoming a tool used by
malicious attackers to break into other systems.
In this paper, we present a conceptual design in which IoT devices are used as tools
in brute-force attacks to break encryption keys of block ciphers. The proposed de-
sign shows that with adequate number of IoT devices employed in the attack, the
attack can succeed in breaking large-key block ciphers.
1 Introduction
As identified in [1], the term Internet-of-Things (IoT) refers to the networked in-
terconnection of everyday objects, which are often equipped with ubiquitous intel-
ligence. These objects can be your home objects, like the lights, refrigerator, and
television, or they can be in a complex industrial environment like intelligent robots
in a factory.
Growing from around 15 billion devices in 2015, the number of IoT devices con-
nected to the Internet around the world have exceeded 23 billion in 2018 [2]. Being
an essential building block in Industry 4.0, IoT adoption rates are expected to grow
at higher rates in the near future. Ref [2] expects the number of IoT devices to grow
to over 75 billion in 2025. This rapid growth year-over-year brings new security
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challenges.
When IoT devices started gaining popularity, the main challenge for mobile IoT de-
vices was battery life[3]. Mobile IoT devices were mostly composed of sensor(s),
wireless communication component, along with the processing unit. At a later stage,
battery issues were mostly resolved with the development of low-power component
that can operate on very low power.
Common security threats studies in information security are mostly focused on data
leakage or service availability. However, threats to IoT are considered mroe serious
because they can directly pause physical risk[4]. Commonly used IoT devices in-
corporate sensors and some kind of actuator. In addition these devices communicate
with each other. Hence, compromised devices at home or in a factory can cause a
lot of damage.
Another category of IoT devices is wearable devices. Any compromise in the se-
curity of these devices can cause leakage to highly private data. These wearable
devices commonly contain multiple types of sensors that are design to collect large
amounts of data. Wearable devices have a wide range of applications in areas like
fitness tracking and vital signs monitoring.
Common security challenges in IoT are roughly summarized in the following non-
exhaustive list:
1. Object identification and authentication.
Authentication and object identification can be a challenging task in the IoT en-
vironment because of the lack of a centralized authentication entity[5].
2. Data protection.
A reasonable countermeasure is to provide end-to-end encryption. However, not
all IoT devices have the resources needed for end-to-end encryption like process-
ing power and memory availability[6]. In addition, data protection is required
while the data is stored in IoT device, not only in transit.
3. Threats to availability.
The availability of IoT devices can be targeted using Denial-of-Service (DoS)
and Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks.
4. Unauthorized access[6].
IoT devices, when unauthorized access is gained, can easily be controlled by the
malicious attacker to perform tasks that the devices should not be performing.
5. Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
Given that IoT devices rely on wireless communications, MITM attacks have a
better chance of succeeding, especially when combined with the lack of a cen-
tralized authentication entity.
6. Compatibility threats.
Conventional network security protocols were built to serve users exchanging
data, and they were not designed to serve machines communicating with each
other[6].
7. Application threats.
Being a new and rapidly developing area, application software written for IoT is
expected to have security weaknesses and loopholes that can cause many zero-
day attacks. Patching will be particularly more complicated as IoT devices are
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designed to work with small memory and storage availability. Hence, software
updates are nto as easy as they seem in personal computers, or networking de-
vices.
The reader can easily note that the list above seems similar to security challenges
in any computer-based system and not necessarily IoT. However, the mechanism in
which these threats are exploited, the counter-measures needed, and even the impact
of exploiting these threats differ significantly when IoT is involved. For example,
DDoS attack carried out on a wearable IoT device would not only render the device
unusable during the attack, rather it would consume the battery power and forces
the device to shut off even after the end of the attack.
2 Block-ciphers and Brute-Force Attacks
In cryptographic terminology, the text before encryption is referred to as plaintext,
while the text after encryption is named ciphertext.
Block ciphers are encryption algorithms that are design to operate on data in the
form of blocks. A block of data, or plaintext, is sent into the algorithm with a key.
The algorithm manipulates the bits of the plaintext to produce the ciphertext. This
manipulation happens based on the value of the key. One of the earliest standards of
block ciphers was the Data Encryption Standard (DES)[7]. DES uses a key size of
56-bits and generates sub-keys that are used in the encryption process that goes for
16 rounds to ensure more secure ciphertext. As mentioned in [7], DES was officially
adopted as a standard in 1976. At that time, the computing power publicly available
was not capable of carrying out a brute-force attack against a 56-bit key.
Brute-force attack is a basic attack that searches for the right encryption key by
trying out all possible keys. Although this type of attack was thought of as impos-
sible on the DES 56-bit key when it was first adopted, many years later, the DES
encryption algorithm was not secure anymore. In addition to the huge increase in
computing power and the growth in the possibility of success of brute-force attacks,
other attacks were capable of reducing the search space or retrieving parts of the
key. Attacks like differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis managed to re-
duce the search space from the 256 [8, 9].
A newer standard, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), was adopted in 2001[10].
The newer standard was more future oriented and adopted key sizes of 128, 192,
and 256 bits. It was also designed to counter the attacks that were possible on DES.
Both AES and DES can be categorized as symmetric ciphers. A symmetric cipher is
an encryption algorithm that employs the same key for encryption and decryption.
The other category; asymmetric ciphers are encryption algorithm that use a key for
encryption and a different key for decryption. The most popular asymmetric cipher
is RSA[11]. In this paper, we will focus on symmetric ciphers brute-force attack.
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3 IoT Device Hijacking
Before the popularity of IoT, node hijacking was not uncommon. Many security
flaws were detected over the years that can be exploited to gain control over a node.
The node can be a personal computer, a server, or a network-connected resource.
One of the common aims of hijacking a node, is to use the node to perform an at-
tack on another node. Hackers have software crawlers that scavenger the Internet
looking for servers or end-user computers with weak protection measures. Once the
malicious attacker gains control over the node, the node can be used as a platform
to perform attacks on other targets. A common attack that employs hacked nodes is
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack. In a DDoS attack, the malicious at-
tacker orchestrates a massive flood of requests directed towards a server or a cluster
of servers to render its service unavailable to its rightful users.
One of the earliest wide-scale IoT attacks took place in 2014 when malicious at-
tackers broke into over 100,000 home IoT devices like televisions and fridges. The
attackers used these hijacked devices to target individuals and businesses around the
world with malicious emails[12].
In 2016, another DDoS attack was executed using millions of web cameras, printers,
and baby monitors. The attack had a stunning bandwidth of 1.2 Tbps, which was the
highest at its time. The unlucky target of the attack was an internet services provider
and infrastructure operator named Dyn. This attack made many of Dyn’s clients’
websites unavailable in different parts of the world like Twitter, Paypal, Amazon,
CNN, Spotify, and WSJ[13].
In 2017, an IoT hijacking botnet namedMirai was discovered. The version infecting
windows-based IoT devices was a result of developments of the malicious software
that previously infected personal computers. According to [14], there is currently
over half a million devices currently that reside in over 164 countries around the
world. In one of its stages of development, Mirai-infected IoT devices jumped from
213000 to 483000 in the period of two weeks.
Another famous malware, that infects linux-based IoT devices is BASHLITE (also
known as Lizkebab, Torlus, and gafgyt)[14]. This malware also uses the hijacked
devices to perform DDoS attacks. It is said that this malware has infected over 1
million IoT devices, and can launch DDoS attack of up 400 Gbps capacity.
IoT devices were also used in attacks that did not involve compromising or hijacking
the IoT device. This type of attacks is referred to as reflective attacks. In a reflec-
tive attack, the attacker sends a query (like TCP syn request) with q spoofed source
IP address to have all response directed to the target IP address. This was, the at-
tacker does not directly attack the target and also amplifies traffic to inflict more
damage[12].
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4 Proposed Design
In 1991, Quisquater and Desmedt introduced the idea of an attacked named the
Chinese Lotto attack [15]. This attack is based on a simple idea; instead of using
supercomputers to launch an exhaustive key-search attack, use a larger number of
regular computers[16]. The concept introduced relies on using distributed comput-
ing to search the complete key space in a relatively short amount of time.
The Chinese lotto attack suggests that a massive number of television devices with
a decryption capability added to them can be used to decrypt an encrypted mes-
sage. The massively large key search space in this brute-force attack is divided into
smaller spaces. Each one of these small search spaces is then assigned to a specific
television set. This way, the search space will be exhausted in a much faster way
because it will be searched by all the televisions in China in parallel. The television
that finds the right key, would signal a message to the television owner that he/she
has won the lotto and they should deliver the key code to the authorities to receive
the prize.
In the proposed conceptual design we use a similar concept but employing a massive
number of IoT devices instead of computers. As brute-force attacks rely on exhaus-
tive search of the whole key space to find the correct decryption key, the proposed
system divides the search space into smaller spaces that can be searched in a rea-
sonable amount of time by one IoT device.
The proposed design employs a central arbitration unit named the Key Distribution
Arbiter (KDA). This arbiter is responsible for assigning keys to IoT devices to as-
sure that each device is assigned an exclusive key space. Figure 1 shows an overview
of the proposed design. This arbiter can be hosted on a single server or can be hosted
on a cloud solution. Cloud hosting of the arbiter is highly recommended for imple-
mentations that include a large number of IoT devices to assure seamless operation
of the system.
The proposed system uses n IoT devices. This arrangement will divide the key
Fig. 1 Overview of IoT Lotto
search space to n smaller search spaces. The main search space has a size of 2u
where u is the key length of the original symmetric encryption key, measured in
bits.
Using n IoT devices would results in having n smaller search spaces each of the size
2u
n
. This means that the time required to exhaust all of the search space, t, will also
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be divided by n to be t
n
. The higher n goes, the less time it takes to find the right key.
Inside each IoT device, three software components are required, as shown in Figure
2. The Key Arbitration Agent (KAA) is the component that coordinates with the
KDA to assure that the key search space assigned to the particular device is exclu-
sive. The second component is the decryption algorithm. This component depends
on the algorithm that was used in encryption as selected earlier by the attacker. The
last component is the one that flags the stop sign when the correct key has been
found.
Fig. 2 Software Components in IoT Devices
4.1 Key Arbitration Process
As mentioned earlier, each IoT device is assigned an exclusive key search space. As
the search process is exhaustive and aims at trying to decrypt the given ciphertext
block with all possible key combinations, each device will be assigned a range of
keys instead of a random key sequence.
For example, if u = 4, then there are 24 possible combinations. Assuming that we
have 4 IoT devices, n = 4, each device is expected to try 2
4
4
= 4 keys. Instead of
transferring the keys and storing them in the memory of the IoT devices, each device
is given the first key and last key in its search space. Hence, for the first IoT device,
the first key is 0000, and the last key is 0011. For the second IoT device, the first
key is 0100 and the last key is 0111. The keys in-between these ranges, can easily
be generated by adding 1 until reaching the last key. Figure 3 shows a flowchart of
the key generation process along with the decryption.
This type of key arbitration reduces the memory requirements at the IoT device
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currKey=firstKey
Decrypt(currKey,ciphertext)
No
Yes
Success?
currKey=lastKey
Stop
msg="Success" + currKey
msg="Failure"
Yes
currKey=currKey+1
Fig. 3 Flowchart of key generation and decryption at the IoT device
side and reduces the amount of data to be transferred between the KDA and the
IoT device, keeping in mind that the example explained earlier is a non-realistic one
because key sizes can be 128, 256, 512, 1024 bits, or higher.
4.2 Key Search Process
As shown in Figure 3, after the first and last keys are received from the KDA, the
KAA starts generating keys and passing them to the decryption process along with
the ciphertext block that is to be decrypted. The process of key generation contin-
ues until either success condition is positive or the whole assigned search space is
exhausted.
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4.3 Success Condition
Just like any other brute-force attacks, IoT lotto success condition is achieved when
the correct decryption key is identified. This can happen in different ways. One of
which is that the ciphertext block used comes from a previously known plaintext
block. Another way is to pass the resulting decrypted text into a dictionary compari-
son to see if it is a word or not. In our conceptual design we adopted the first method
which relies on having a known plaintext-ciphertext pair prior to the decryption pro-
cess.
5 Discussion
The proposed conceptual design introduces a system in which a large group of
IoT devices can be used as decryption machines to find an encryption key through
brute-force attack. The proposed system reduces the time required for the exhaus-
tive search in the key space.
The time reduction comes from the fact that the large network of IoT devices are
searching in a parallel fashion in different parts of the search space. When the sys-
tem employs n IoT devices, the required time is divided by n.
The memory and complexity requirements for the process are heavily dependent
on the specific block cipher used. Some advanced block ciphers can be complex
and memory consuming. Other encryption algorithms are considered lightweight in
terms of memory and complexity. However, the memory requirement is heavily re-
duced by the technique of key arbitration used in the proposed system. Using this
self-key-generation technique reduces the memory requirement in addition to no-
ticeable reduction in traffic between the KDA and the IoT device.
the size of the search space depends on the encryption key length and the number
of IoT devices as well. With a key-length of u bits, and n IoT devices, each IoT
device’s sub-space has 2
u
n
. For older encryption standards like DES, where the key
size is 56 bits, finding the key can be an easy task. With a total key search space
of 256 = 7.205 ∗ 1016, if the system employs one million devices, the sub-space for
each device would be around 72057594038 keys. If in each second 1000 keys are
used, a total of about 834 days are needed. If for the same setup 100 million devices
are used, the key will be found within 8 days.
For complex and modern encryption algorithms like AES, key sizes and time to de-
crypt increase rapidly. if a 512-bit key is used with and arrangement similar to the
DES example earlier, the time needed will be 1.551 ∗ 10138 days, using 100 million
devices, and processing 1000 keys/second.
Employing IoT devices does not necessary involve hijacking control of these de-
vices. When IoT devices become part of every house, we might get to a point where
people can rent out their IoT devices for similar uses. This can also involve renting
only the free time of these IoT devices. There can be in the future services for device
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processing power rent out, similar to the idea of AirBnB, where people would enlist
their devices and their availability time.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
The proposed conceptual design shows that IoT devices can be used in a collective
manner to search for the encryption key of a block cipher in a brute-force attack.
However, when the block cipher used has a large key size with complex mathemati-
cal operations, the proposed system can be slow, unless it employs a massively large
number of IoT devices.
In our future work, we will be working on implementing the proposed design on a
small scale to prove the concept proposed here. Another dimension of future work
is applying the proposed system to asymmetric ciphers.
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